In a government press briefing, Minister without Portfolio John Reid answered questions from journalists on a number of issues including Iraq, Cabinet, the asylum system and the death of DC Oake.
Read a transcript of the briefing in full below:
Dr Reid:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I’ve just come from the Cabinet and I thought I would bring you up to date on where we are on a number of issues which we discussed at the Cabinet this morning.
Obviously our thoughts continue to be with the family of Detective Constable Stephen Oake and his colleagues in the Greater Manchester Force, and the Home Secretary brought us up to date this morning both on the continuing investigation and the internal enquiry which is being held into the circumstances of Stephen Oake’s tragic death. As the Home Secretary promised, I think he will be putting out a Written Statement with further details later on today. I’m not exactly sure what time that will be I think around lunchtime but the important thing is that the events in Manchester underlined the message contained in the Prime Minister’s New Year Message about the nature of the threat which we face from terrorism which was brought home by those terrible events, and the need to recognise that this is a new kind of threat. While obviously we must be careful on what we say because of the legal process, we should also recognise that terrorists will also try to get around whatever systems we put in place to further their ends. We will obviously continue to support the Police and the other agencies in every way as they try to counter that threat, and as the Prime Minister underlined yesterday in his conversation with the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, we are not only committed to that, we have been over the course of the last year or two bringing forward measures to try and combat both terrorism and misuse of the asylum system.
As you would expect, we also discussed Iraq in the Cabinet this morning. If I might, let me underline a few basic points. First of all I would say that the meeting this morning brought home once again to me the extent of unity there is on this issue in the Cabinet. Our goal is straightforward, which is the disarmament of Saddam Hussein, and our approach is equally straightforward, to pursue the United Nations route, as we have done under the Prime Minister’s leadership, and to give the Inspectors time and space and support, the support they need to carry out their job, which is why the Prime Minister himself will be seeing Hans Blix at Chequers tomorrow. That is the position of the Prime Minister, every member of the Cabinet, including myself. But we are also clear that if Saddam continues to defy the will of the United Nations and the international community, then we must deal with that and ensure that he is disarmed one way or another. So the choice of how this happens is his. But what he can no longer do is pretend that he is complying with the United Nations, when all along is he is trying to fool it, while building up his arsenal of weapons with which to blackmail the region and the rest of the world.
That is all I will say by way of introduction. I will try and cover any questions you’ve got, and then when I go I think Godric will come in and fill in as well. We’ll have this side first.
Question:
[indistinct] . . . second UN Resolution I believe we will get one. What therefore is the British Government’s message this morning to the US Administration, which according to the lead Iraq stories in both the New York Times and the Washington Post, is specifically briefing Administration officials that they do not want to pursue a second UN Resolution route?
Dr Reid:
Well the first point I want to make is the British Government is making the decisions we are making because it is in the British national interest. We think that Saddam Hussein is a threat not only to his region and to the world more generally but to our national interest. That is why we are reaching these decisions. And secondly, all along we have, in our actions as well as in our words, tried to pursue the stance against Saddam Hussein through the international community, because it is the will of the international community that is being flouted. And thirdly, I repeat, it is our preferred option to have I won’t call it a second Resolution it is yet another Resolution on this issue, but we have made absolutely plain that while that is our preference, we and that means every member of the Cabinet have put on record that they don’t want to be confined by that preference.
Question:
.. the British Government and the American Government on the way they want
to pursue the Iraq matter now.
Dr Reid:
Well, I don’t accept that there is a difference because I haven’t actually seen the reports to which you refer. I know you are waving them at me Adam, but I haven’t read them in detail. All I would say is that I think that by any standards any objective observer will have noticed the extent to which the United States Government and the President have gone to involve themselves in the United Nations route, both in actions and again in words, as the President made plain in his speech to the UN itself. So that is our preferred route all along. I’m sure that’s the instinct of the people of this country. It certainly is of the Government and, if I might say so, of the Labour Party.
Question:
Why do you think it is that the Prime Minister, and indeed the Cabinet, have been unable to persuade the great bulk of the Labour Party that Britain will not be going it alone, without another Resolution? If everyone is so united, which in itself surprises me at Cabinet level, why is the rest of the Party not behind you?
Dr Reid:
Well, I have given my estimate of where I think the Labour Party is. I gave this morning, as a Cabinet Minister obviously on Government time and Government expenses, but I have previously said that my view is that the
Labour Party is about where the people of this country are. There are a minority on both sides of this argument. One minority no doubt thinks that we should go very early to military action because Saddam Hussein understands nothing else. On the other side there is a minority which says that they would not take military action irrespective of the causes or consequences or whatever the circumstance is. That is not where the bulk of people in this country are. The bulk of people in this country I am convinced recognise that there is a threat from Saddam Hussein, that it is a unique threat, that he has continuously defied the will of the world, and the will of the world should therefore be carried out. They want us to do that, they want us to do it through the United Nations, that is what we have been doing, and they would prefer if it was done by diplomacy. If it cannot be done by diplomacy, under those circumstances I believe people would support military action and at the end of the day I don’t think we are in a hugely dissimilar position from the period before Afghanistan, the period before Kosovo, where people had natural and understandable concerns as any human being should have, whether they are in the Cabinet, Government, a Party, or just a citizen of the country about the prospect of military conflict. That’s perfectly understandable. It is the job of Government to weigh in the balance these arguments and to show leadership, and I think
that at the end of the day if Saddam Hussein does not respond to the diplomacy and the entreaties and politics of the international community, then people recognise that he has to be disarmed by other means.
Question:
What is your evidence for your view that the majority of people in this country would support military action at the end of the day? Only 34% in the latest poll said that they were sufficiently convinced by George Bush and Tony Blair that Saddam Hussein was enough of a threat to justify military action. And can you also tell us on this question of time and space the convenient formula that the Government uses was the Prime Minister pressed in Cabinet this morning to explain how much time and space, or did he volunteer any information on that?
Dr Reid:
Well, the answer to the second question is no. The answer to the first question is you are asking me to make my judgement about something that happens in the future, that is what people will feel if at the end of the day there is a material breach, the Inspectors report that Saddam still refuses to disarm, and you then say what is the evidence at that stage. Well I can’t give you evidence in the future, I can only give you my judgement, and that is what I am doing on that, and I am saying that I understand the anxieties and concerns which people have in the country as a whole, in any particular political party, and I say to you that no politician can contemplate the use of military force without anxiety and concern and the gravest consideration. That is natural. It does not mean to say that ultimately people are not prepared to see it used if it is the only way to stop a dictator from potentially using weapons of mass destruction.
Question:
Could you perhaps just characterise a little bit more about this discussion in Cabinet, because we know there was an extensive discussion in September? Since then it has been more of a report back. Just a little information on how long you discussed and how many people participated would be helpful. And can you clarify something I think I heard you say I might be wrong - did you say that the Cabinet were united behind the view that a second Resolution might not be necessary?
Dr Reid:
The second one is yes.
Question:
How do you know? Did you go right round the table saying that in the event that we cannot get a second Resolution are you ready for military action. Did everybody positively assent to that, or was it that they simply didn’t say no.
Dr Reid:
Well the answer to your question about the Cabinet discussion. It was quite a long discussion. I didn’t take a note of how many people actually contributed, but there was a pretty widespread discussion with people putting their point of view. I have heard no-one dissent from the view that on a second Resolution it is the preferred course of action and it is not a second Resolution, it is yet another one and where I have heard people’s views interpreted like that I have checked what they have actually said, then the interpretation has not been borne out by the facts. I have made it plain. Clare Short of course made it plain explicitly in her interview recently that while she preferred it, as we do, that she would not be confined by that. I think the key point here is that people want to know whether there has been a material breach, and that is largely down to the evidence of the Inspectors. On how long, time and space, no there is no specific deadline put on that, and the Prime Minister has made it clear that he doesn’t have such a deadline.
Question:
What burden of evidence would be required, because of course there is a political as well as a judgement about war, what would be necessary?
Dr Reid:
In the first case this a matter for the Inspectors and in the second case it is a matter for the United Nations Security Council itself and discussions go on in the wider context all the time. I think Jack Straw is at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council Ministerial on Monday, for instance. But ultimately that decision is the work of the Inspectors, it is the Inspectors’ view on that, and then it is the United Nations Security Council themselves.
Question:
What was the nature of the Cabinet discussion, were any particular areas that were discussed? And are you confident that Clare Short really will stick to this and that she is prepared to back the idea of not being confined to a second Resolution?
Dr Reid:
Well, as far as the discussions were concerned, without going into details, it covered I suppose most of the issues you would expect such a discussion to cover: the prospects, the conditions. I think it is safe to say that there was universalcommendation - please make sure you get that word right, it is commendation, not condemnation - of the Prime Minister’s performance yesterday at the Parliamentary Labour Party, and afterwards at Prime Minister’s Questions, both in content, direction and tone. There was unanimous support by the time I left and admittedly the discussions were still going on, though most of them had express support both for his resolve in addressing this issue, and the manner in which it had been done. And I have no reason to believe that the unanimity that was expressed at that meeting will be followed up by anything other than unanimity in practice. This is a very complex issue, and it is a very grave issue and therefore it is very easy to take one particular sentence from anything I say, and any other member of the Cabinet, and to make a headline out of it. I noticed a headline this morning that one member of the Cabinet had refused to say that she would never consider resignation under any circumstances at all. Well, I could never say that I would never consider any circumstance, nor could any other member of the Cabinet. "Never say never" is something that’s been pretty standard. It’s not a new story. So all I am saying is that the whole gist of what happened at Cabinet this morning was an exhibition of unity of the Cabinet.
Question:
But was it an example of Cabinet playing a role and actually influencing things, or maybe listening to what Tony Blair told them. Did people ask questions and challenge?
Dr Reid:
Of course, and not for the first time. I don’t recognise the descriptions I saw several months ago about never having had a discussion in Cabinet on Iraq. It isn’t true. This is one of a series of discussions to be held, and I have contributed to at least three or four of them.
Question:
Dr Reid, the Government and the Prime Minister seem to be drawing together the strings between Iraq and terrorism generally, making it clear that there is a link. In the light of recent events, does the Government have any regrets about its failure to keep closer tabs on the movements of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers in the last five years?
Dr Reid:
On the first question, I think we should be absolutely plain that both the challenge and threat from Iraq and the threat from international terrorism are distinct threats in their own right and it is not a question of whether you face up to one or the other. You have to face up to both. However, it is true that anyone who observes what has been happening over recent years, in particular the attempts by terrorist groups to get hold of weapons of mass destruction, and the amount of potential trading in some of these that is going on, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that at some stage there is a grave danger that these two types of phenomena will come together. In other words, states which are either encouraging terrorism or developing weapons of mass destruction, or the delivery systems, and international terrorists who are looking to obtain such weapons. And we have seen that these terrorists really are not concerned about the scale of loss they inflict. We saw that in the Twin Towers, and the difference between 3,000 and 30,000 to them will be as nothing. So that is really the context in which the two things come together. As far as you were asking about our view on asylum seekers, one of the ironies is that over the past few years David Blunkett and the Government have been criticised, as was Jack Straw, for being too tough on these issues, and some of the voices that are now being raised saying that we haven’t done enough, have actually opposed some of the measures we have been trying to bring in, in order to combat the misuse of the asylum system. I don’t want to get this out of context. David Blunkett said yesterday there are 90 million passenger journeys to Britain, and only 80,000 asylum seekers, out of whom under the piece of legislation he mentioned only 15 have been arrested. Nevertheless, there is no doubt in our mind that there is a concern about international terrorism, about rising crime, and about those who seek to misuse the asylum system, and that is why over the last few years we have taken a range of measures. I was looking at some of them this morning. Most recently we have embarked on a major process of strengthening our border controls. For the first time we have set up joint immigration mechanics and controls with France and Belgium in France and Belgium. We have installed new technology at the Channel Tunnel entry points and the Calais ports which has been extended to their ones in France. In addition we have brought in a comprehensive visa regime with extensive systems for checking passengers who are coming into the country. We have introduced in the last year a system where all asylum seekers now have to have an identification card an application registration card is the technical term for it which is a photograph and a fingerprint on it. We now require them to report regularly to authorities. We have taken steps with the new Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act to ensure that terrorists who would misuse that system can’t hide behind the refugee status. We can now deport someone who is found to be in that position who commits serious crimes. And for those who we can’t deport because it is deemed that the place to which we would send them would be an unsafe place, we have got the powers now, passed over the past year, to put them into detention.
Question:
In terms of the thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, who have simply disappeared, partly because the Government has abandoned the checking out system, so that you know who’s coming in and who’s leaving. Are you going to reinstate that? Are you going to bring forward the entitlement cards more rapidly? Are there any measures that you can see which are going to reassure people about these people who simply disappear?
Dr Reid:
What you can be assured of is that despite the fact that we have been putting in place a whole series of measures, sometimes against resistance from the Conservatives as well as others who have got liberal objections, David Blunkett will continue to examine any ways in which we can make the asylum system in particular more effective for those who are genuinely seeking asylum and more watertight against those who would attempt to use it. I would merely say, don’t over-emphasise the desire of would-be terrorists to use this system exclusively. With 90 million passenger visitors to the country every year, these are very devious people, and they will use any means to get in, but we have been doing, and will continue to apply our minds to any ways in which we can make that system more watertight.
Question:
How do you characterise the differences between positions of the United States and Britain on the war in Iraq?
Dr Reid:
On the big issues there is common agreement, not only between the United States and Britain, but right across the international community, throughout the United Nations Security Council acting on behalf of the world, and I think when you are faced with a threat from a dictator like Saddam Hussein the best thing to do is to emphasise the common message. And the common message, whatever experience, national interest or background people bring to arriving at that common message, the common message is simple, and that is that the world demands that Saddam Hussein gives up his weapons of mass destruction. The international community wishes that to be done peacefully and by diplomacy, but if he doesn’t do it that way he will have to be disarmed by force. That is the message that is common to the United Nations.
Question:
What about regime change and how Britain and the US feel about that?
Dr Reid:
Our objective here is to disarm Saddam Hussein. If that can be done through a degree of honesty, enlightenment and a sudden change of heart on the part of Saddam Hussein, everyone will welcome that, not least those of us who could be involved in sending our young men and women to enforce the will of the United Nations. Of course we would welcome that. But that is a choice for Saddam Hussein and if he will not disarm, which is our objective, then he will have to be disarmed. And the reality is that, if he gets himself in that position, he is asking for regime change himself.
Question:
This is a narrow question, I acknowledge that, but it is important. What I heard you say about the preference for yet another UN Resolution, you went on to say that every member of the Cabinet has put on record that they do not want to be confined to that preference. Is that just your general impression, or were you speaking literally?
Dr Reid:
Sorry. Your shorthand is wrong. You can run the tape back. I didn’t say every member of Cabinet has put on record. I said that no-one dissented from that view. Everyone in my view supports that, and even those who have been portrayed as objecting to that, when you check the record they have said the words I used which is I would prefer a second United Nations Resolution, but I am not going to be confined to that. Now that, I think, if you check you will find is a verbatim quote that Clare Short used the other day. So we can talk about this question as long as you like, but actually there is agreement on it. All we have done on it is to refuse to rule out action in the absence of another Resolution, because we recognise that there are circumstances where the near unanimous will of the United Nations could be blocked by a unilateral veto.
Question:
But wasn’t Clare Short saying I am in favour of a second Resolution, but I don’t think we should aim for just that? There is a theoretical second Resolution that could then authorise almost everything.
Dr Reid:
Yes, I wasn’t quoting verbatim from her New Statesman report today, I was quoting verbatim from the interview she carried out 48 hours ago.
Question:
Yes you will agree that that actually undermines what you’re saying because she is saying that a second Resolution might not be enough.
Dr Reid:
Look, you can dance round the head of this pin all you like. I will send you the quotes from Clare.
Question:
Well, I was given . . .
Dr Reid:
No, you have given me another quote from Clare. I will give you the quote from Clare that says specifically "I absolutely want to go down with the second resolution, however I am not going to be confined by that." That is exactly my position. And I have used exactly the words that Clare used.
Question:
On the events on Manchester, you keep talking about it as the front line against terror. We know that one of those men is clearly a killer. We know they are illegal immigrants. But on what basis can you say that this is the front line against terror? On what basis can you call them terrorists? And if you do have a basis, aren’t you undermining any chance whatsoever of actually convicting them, by actually branding them as terrorists before they have even been charged with any offence?
Dr Reid:
Yes, there is a fine judgement to be made here. I haven’t gone into any of the details of what happened, any of the names, but I think it would be obvious that the country expects a degree of information to be put out on issues like that, and we have been quite judicious in what we have said on the matter. As far as the front line is concerned, the police and the emergency services here are the front line against terrorism. It goes without saying that I, along with not only every other member of the Government, but I am sure every other member of this country, has an enormous respect for the courage and professionalism that is shown by the police in these circumstances, and if I may add just a personal note, me in particular because I benefit from the protection and the expertise and professionalism of many of the people who were involved, and tragically one of whom died, when I visit the Manchester area.
Question:
If Saddam disarms then would you be prepared to deal with him again? Everything will be normal?
Dr Reid:
I can’t say that everything would be normal. I can’t envisage us going for a pint together, but if you are asking me whether the objective is the disarmament of Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction, the answer is yes. That is our primary objective, and depending on how we have to do that, it may be a consequence of that that Saddam himself has to be removed.
Question:
You said again today that the Cabinet won’t stand exclusively by the need for a second Resolution because there might be an unreasonable veto. But isn’t the difference between the kind of people from Washington who have made no secret of their disdain for the United Nations process, the difference between them and you and Colin Powell, as well is that you want to go through the UN if you can and there is a significant element in the Bush Administration which can’t be bothered with the formalities of the UN at all? And secondly, the Prime Minister yesterday said there is no conspiracy to divide up Iraqi oil but why don’t Ministers make more of the fact that if Iraq were to run amok on its neighbours’ oil fields, let alone its own, then the lights in this room would go out in three weeks, or is it perhaps a month?
Dr Reid:
Well, on the first point I think that’s more a commentary on the differences between the system of government here and in the United States. Here we have a collective Cabinet responsibility, whereas in the United States the various Secretaries of State tend to give off their views and opinions in a way which no-one in the Cabinet would think of doing, so that you can discern differences over there. And then of course if one sounds more hawkish than another, that can be taken as the view of the United States Administration. We take the view of the United States Administration in their actions and wants which is support for the United Nations, it is support for United Nations Resolution 1441, and they will play their full part no doubt as other members of the Security Council will when the inspectors report. On your second point, while it is true that the supply of oil, as in any energy source, is of importance to any advanced, civilised industrialised country, nonetheless it is also true that it is not the cause of the stance that is being taken by the United Nations. It is just not true that this would be the best way to supply oil or get our hands on oil, and as the Prime Minister pointed out yesterday if that was the main reason, our primary reason, for what we were doing, then people would cut a deal with Saddam Hussein. It is also worth reminding people that many of the people who are saying that we should not contemplate military action because it is only oil behind it and are saying that of Iraq are the very same people who said, many of them, that we should not contemplate military action in Kosovo when there was no question of oil, and the same argument goes for those who portray this somehow as a war against the Arabs or a war against Islam. It is not the case that these are the primary or even an important factor from the point of view of our national interest. It is Saddam Hussein who is a threat to the national interests of this country.
Question:
This issue of asylum terrorists, do you think this is going to give ammunition to the EU opponents who always said that bringing down the borders within Europe is going to be a boost to terrorists, and do you think there is a groundswell of opinion for a return to border controls as a means of countering this . . .
Dr Reid:
Sorry, I missed the point. Are you saying that the whole question will give an argument to those who wish to stop EU enlargement?
Question:
No. One of the arguments when border controls were removed was that this would bring an increase in terrorism and now this is where the debate has moved on to. Is this more ammunition?
Dr Reid:
I don’t think anyone would argue that the commonality of border controls has somehow caused an increase in terrorism. If anything the argument they would deploy is that terrorism has increased for other reasons, but this makes it harder to deal with. Now I don’t think that argument is true, particularly since over the past two years, as I pointed out, Jack Straw and then David Blunkett have been taking a considerable number of measures to tighten up our immigration controls, to expedite them, and to tighten up the abuse of the asylum system. The irony is that many people who are in the last 48 hours demanding action on this, were the very same people who opposed some of the measures that we tried to put through, and that includes the Conservative Party, not only in the House of Commons, but particularly in the House of Lords.
Question:
Are you satisfied that a sufficient level of intelligence is being shared between the Security Services and Police Forces amid suggestions that some of the Greater Manchester Police Officers weren’t made fully aware of the level of threat that they faced?
Dr Reid:
I won’t comment on the specifics for reasons that will be obvious and in any case, as I said, the Home Secretary will be making a Written Statement later today on some further details of it. Obviously there is a specific investigation ongoing by the Greater Manchester Police themselves. Obviously we keep under review all the time how we analyse and how we utilise intelligence materials. That is not something that we only do at specific intervals, but I am content from my own experience that there is a good and efficient use of intelligence. It is important to remember that it isn’t possible to predict all events, and a huge amount of intelligence and there is a huge amount which varies from the corroborated and the reliable right through to the suggestive and the speculative comes in and has to be analysed and it isn’t always possible to predict that given things or people will be in given places doing certain specific things at a given time. So yes, we keep reviewing that, but if there are any lessons to be learned either from Manchester or on a wider stage we obviously would learn those lessons.
Question:
The other day some American correspondents had a briefing from one of your Cabinet colleagues, and he said more needs to be done to persuade British public opinion of the efficacy of the Iraq policy, and I am wondering if your appearance here is the beginning of perhaps of a Ministerial offensive to get your colleagues around the country in talking up the Blair policy on Iraq.
Dr Reid:
I don’t think that any civilised, democratic society contemplates the use of military force without the gravest consideration and neither I, nor the Prime Minister or anyone else have any qualms about accepting that. Indeed any Minister who is in that position has an obligation to give it the gravest consideration and therefore when questions are raised, in a democratic society, inside or outside the political parties, inside or outside the Government, that is a legitimate part of the process of us deciding on our action. Thank God it is like that. It is not like that in Iraq, and it is one of our great strengths. And that is why I am convinced that ultimately, if we have to use the ultimate sanction of force, the fact that we have been questioning and concerned in the run up to that decision, will not be a source of weakness, it will be a source of strength, because ultimately democratic decision-making does give us strength to our resolution and I hope in no way the functioning of our democracy is interpreted by Saddam Hussein or anyone else outside these shores as a lack of resolution on the part of this Government or the people of this country.
Thank you very much indeed.
delicious
digg
facebook
