Statement on the the use of communications intercepts as evidence

6 February 2008

Statement to Parliament on the Chilcot Report on the the use of communications intercepts as evidence in court.

The Prime Minister said that the report examines both the potential benefits and the risks of accepting intercepts as evidence.

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The Government is today publishing the results of work on the use of communications intercepts as evidence: the report of the committee of privy councillors, drawn from the three major parties chaired by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB.

And I am grateful to Sir John, Lord Hurd, Lord Archer, and the Rt. Hon. Member for Berwick for that report. It is thorough, measured, detailed, and unanimous; and it properly reflects both the seriousness and the complexity of the questions their committee was asked to address.

And let me again pay tribute to our security agencies for all that they do - quietly and effectively -- in the defence of our country.

I have met and listened to those who lead these agencies, and many who serve in them. And I praise their expertise, professionalism and courage, often in the most testing and dangerous of circumstances, but always in the best interests of our country.

And I acknowledge - as we all acknowledge - that what they do defends our freedom, protects our society, and saves lives.

The use of intercept in evidence characterises a central dilemma we face as a free society - that of preserving our liberties and the rule of law, while at the same time keeping our nation safe and secure.
In July, in the first statement I made on security, I said that I favoured the principle of using intercept material as evidence in criminal cases -- if -- but only if -- a way can be found to do so while protecting the higher interests of national security.

I therefore invited the cross-party Chilcot committee to advise on "whether a regime to allow the use of intercepted material in court can be devised that facilitates bringing cases to trial while meeting the overall imperative to safeguard national security."

Today I am publishing a version of the Chilcot committee's report. The committee themselves have prepared this version, which omits - in the interests of national security -- certain sensitive facts and arguments. Its main conclusions and recommendations are exactly those of the full report.

Briefly, the report examines in detail both the potential benefits of accepting intercept as evidence, and the risks that might arise from such acceptance.

However, it concludes that it should be possible to find a way to use some intercept material as evidence, provided - and only provided - that certain key conditions can be met. These conditions relate to the most vital imperative of all - that of safeguarding our national security.

The Government accepts this recommendation - and takes the accompanying conditions very seriously.
Intercepts are strictly controlled under the 2000 legislation. Interception is allowed only if it is necessary to obtain information which could not be acquired in another way, and any interception must be proportionate to what it seeks to achieve.

The relevant decisions of ministers are overseen by a senior judge; the Interception of Communications Commissioner, who reports at least annually; and an investigatory powers tribunal exists to consider complaints from the public, and has powers to order appropriate remedies.

The most recent figures for numbers of interception warrants are contained in the Interception Commissioner's Annual Report, published on 28 January. 1,435 intercept warrants were issued in the last 9 months of 2006. This compares with 2,407 in the previous 15 months.

The Chilcot report notes that there are already limited circumstances in civil and terrorist proceedings where intercept can be used in evidence. Each of these instances includes appropriate protections - such as closed proceedings - to ensure that the use of intercept does not put our national security at risk.

For any new regime, Chilcot sets down conditions which start from the proposition that "any material risk to the strategic capability of the UK's intelligence agencies would be unacceptable", and that "any disclosure of interception capabilities could have a profound impact on national security." This is right.

The report also says that any resulting reduction in inter-agency cooperation "could have a profound impact on law enforcement agencies' ability to combat serious crime and terrorism in the UK," and the Government also agrees with this assessment.

The report sets out nine conditions in detail. These relate to complex and important issues, and include:

• Giving the intercepting agencies the ability to retain control over whether their material is used in prosecutions
• Ensuring that disclosure of material cannot be required against the wishes of the agency originating the material
• Protecting the current close cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies
• Ensuring that agencies cannot be required to transcribe or make notes of material beyond a standard of detail they deem necessary.

The committee acknowledges that further extensive work is needed to see whether and how these and other conditions -- intended to protect sensitive techniques, safeguard resources, and ensure that intercept can still be used effectively for intelligence -- can be met.

This is a unanimous recommendation that the Government accepts. We will proceed to develop a detailed implementation plan under which material might be made available to be used in criminal cases in England and Wales - subject, and strictly subject, to meeting all the Chilcot conditions.

The report is clear that if the conditions could not be met then intercept as evidence should not be introduced, and the Government accepts this.

Similarly, the committee recommends that, in the event of a regime being introduced which later fails to meet the Chilcot conditions or otherwise threatens our security, that regime should be removed pending the introduction of another, under which the conditions can once again be met. The Government also accepts this recommendation.

The report also states that the committee have seen no evidence to suggest that the need for measures such as control orders would be reduced by the introduction of intercept as evidence.

Designing a regime to meet the Chilcot conditions will require - as the committee notes - a substantial programme of work covering legal, operational and technical issues. This work must involve and engage the intelligence agencies, Government departments, the legal system, and those responsible for communications.

The Chilcot team have made it clear to me that the necessary work should be led by an implementation team within governmment; and that that team should move ahead comprehensively and quickly. But they have also told me that they would not expect the work to be concluded in time to inform the counter-terrorism bill currently before parliament.

The Government strongly believes that it is in the national interest to draw on a wide range of expert external advice. The cross-party nature of the Chilcot report has been of great value. I am therefore grateful for the agreement of opposition parties that Sir John Chilcot, Lord Archer and the Rt. Hon. Member for Berwick, and another member to be nominated, will advise on privy councillor terms during the next stage of the work.

The Chilcot report also notes that communications technology is changing and changing rapidly, with the switch towards internet protocol communications and the clear implications that brings for our security.

Accordingly, we have launched the Interception Modernisation Programme to update our capability to ensure that -- under these new circumstances -- our national interests will continue to be protected. The new regime for intercept as evidence must be designed to work safely and effectively for this new capability too.

As the Chilcot report states, the challenges ahead are complex and must not, and will not, be under-estimated, but the Government acknowledges and endorses the valuable work of the Chilcot committee and is grateful for the committee's support in our continuing efforts to meet the double challenge we face as a nation:

The challenge is to at all times and without fail to protect our nation's security while advancing the rule of law. And this we will always seek to do -- and I commend this statement to the house.